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WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Churches receive other tax exemptions, however, about which there
are no definitive Supreme Court cases. These include exemptions from
death and gift taxes at the state level,29 exemption from income tax-
ation at both the state30 and federal3' levels, and exemption from sales
and other excise taxes. 2 On the basis of Walz, it appears that these
areas of exemption would be upheld if they are ever considered by the
Court.
JAMES W. CORBITT, JR.
Constitutional Law-DEATH PENALTY AS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT FOR RAPE. Ralph v. Warden, No. 13,757 (4th Cir., Dec.
11, 1970).
On January 18, 1961, the petitioner was convicted of rape, and
sentenced to death in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County,
Maryland.' In appealing the dismissal of a habeas corpus petition, he
contended that the death penalty, under the circumstances, constituted
cruel and unusual punishment as proscribed by the Constitution. 2 Re-
versing the conviction, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held that the eighth amendment's prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment forbids Ralph's execution for rape, since
his victim's life was neither taken, nor endangered. 3
29. Note, Constitutionality of Tax Benefits Accorded Religion, 49 COLUM. L. REv.
968, 974 (1949).
30. Id. at 979.
31. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 501(c) (3).
32. Note, supra note 29, at 981.
1. This unreported case was noted in Ralph v. State, 226 Md. 480, 481, 174 A.2d 163,
164 (1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 813 (1962). The state of Maryland authorizes capital
punishment for a person convicted of the crime of rape. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461
(Rep1. Vol. 1971) provides:
Every person convicted of a crime of rape or as being accessory thereto
before the fact shall, at the discretion of the court, suffer death, or be sen-
tenced to confinement in the penitentiary for the period of his natural life,
or undergo a confinement in the penitentiary for not less than eighteen
months nor more than twenty-one years; and penetration shall be evidence
of rape, without proof of emission.
2. Ralph v. Warden, No. 13,757 (4th Cir., Dec. 11, 1970), rehearing denied, (4th
Cir, Mar. 1, 1971). The issue of whether the imposition of the death penalty on a
convicted rapist constitutes cruel and unusual punishment was raised by the same
petitioner in this court in 1964. Ralph v. Pepersack, 335 F.2d 128, 141 (4th Cir. 1964).
In that case the court found no Supreme Court decision to support such a contention,
and refused to act favorably upon it.
3. Ralph v. Warden, No. 13,757 at 2 (4th Cir., Dec. 11, 1970).
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The eighth amendment provides, "Excessive bail shall not be re-
quired, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted." ' In attempting to interpret and apply this amendment, the
Supreme Court has continuously recognized the indefinite limits and
scope of the provision.5 Initially, in capital cases, the Court looked to
the manner of execution rather than the substance of the punishment
itself to determine whether eighth amendment strictures had been
violated." In Wilkerson v. Utah,7 the Court ruled that death by shooting
was not cruel and unusual punishment, limiting that term to "atroci-
ties"8
4. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
Prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment had its origins in the Magna Carta. See
chapter 14 of the Magna Carta, printed as confirmed by King Edward I in 1297, 4
HALSBuRY, STATUTES OF ENGLAND 24 (2d ed. 1948), which provides: "A freeman shall
not be amerced for a small fault, but after the manner of the fault, and for a great
fault, after the greatness thereof. . . ." The phrase itself first appeared in the English
Bill of Rights of 1688, and it formed a part of the Virginia Declaration of Rights
adopted in 1776. James Madison placed it in the constitutional amendments he drafted
in 1789, and it was incorporated in the Constitution in 1791 as part of the eighth amend-
ment. Note, The Effectiveness of the Eighth Amendment: An Appraisal of Cruel and
Unusual Punishmem, 36 N.Y.U. L. REv. 846 (1961).
Since the adoption of the federal Constitution, cruel and unusual punishment provi-
sions have been incorporated into the constitutions of forty-eight states. Id. at 847 n. 7.
5. Ralph v. Warden, No. 13,757 at 7 (4th Cir., Dec. 11, 1970). The imprecision of
the amendment was first noted by Justice Clifford in Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130
(1878). In delivering the opinion of the Court, he said, "Difficulty would attend the
effort to define with exactness the extent of the Constitutional provision which pro-
vides that cruel and unusual punishment shall not be inflicted. . . ?' 99 U.S. at 135-36.
The lack of precision was further noted by the Court in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86
(1958). The Court stated that "the words of the [Eighth] Amendment are not precise,
and that their scope is not static." 356 U.S. at 100-01.
6. In Re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
Such an interpretation was consistent with the views of the framers of the Consti-
tution. See Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted": The Original
Meaning, 57 CAL. L. Rav. 839, 841-42 (1969). See also Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349, 393-98 (1909) (dissent).
7. 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
8. Id. at 135. Mr. Justice Clifford said:
Difficulty would attend the effort to define with exactness the extent of the
constitutional provision which provides that cruel and unusual punishments
shall not be inflicted; but it is safe to affirm that punishments of torture, such
as those mentioned by the commentator referred to, and all others in the
same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment to the
Constitution.
Id. at 135-36.
In a subsequent case, In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1889), the Court reiterated
the holding of Wilkerson characterizing punishments as cruel "when they involve tor-
ture or a lingering death.'
See generally People v. Oppenheimer, 156 Cal. 733, 106 P. 74 (1909); State v. Burris,
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Not until 1910, in the case of Weems v. United States,9 did the Su-
preme Court go beyond the circumstances of the punishment, and indi-
cate other standards which could be determinative of a punishment's
constitutional status.' There the Court ruled that it was "a precept of
justice that punishment for crime should be graduated, and proportioned
to offense."" In determining a test by which to regard the eighth
amendment, the Court stated that the cruel and unusual punishment
clause is to be viewed as progressive; it "is not fastened to the obsolete,
but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a
humane justice." 12
Weems has had little practical application in the courts."3 One rea-
son for this is that six years after the decision the Court rejected an
eighth amendment claim on the basis of pre-Weems dictum, substan-
tially reducing its effectiveness.' 4 A more pervasive reason for the
194 Iowa 628, 190 N.W. 38 (1922); Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 91 A. 417 (1914);
State v. Gee Jon, 46 Nev. 418, 211 P. 676 (1923).
9. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
10. The first case to apply a proportion test was State v. Driver, 78 N.C. 423 (1878).
As early as 1892, in the case of O'Neill v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892), Justice
Field in a dissenting opinion suggested that the eighth amendment forbids not only
inherently cruel punishments such as torture and barbarism, but "all punishments which
by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offences
charged."
11. 217 U.S. at 367. The case involved a minor government official in the Philip-
pines, who was convicted of falsifying a public document. The minimum punishment
for the crime, as provided by statute: (1) twelve years and one day of cadena tem-
pora!-imprisonment at chains at hard labor; (2) certain excessory penalties, (a) civil
interdiction, (b) permanent absolute disqualification (i.e. right to vote, hold public
office, etc.), (c) subjection to official surveillance; (3) a fine of 1250 pesetas. Noting
this, the Court declared the entire statutory penalty unconstitutionally disproportionate
to so minor a crime.
12. 217 U.S. at 378. Refusing to restrain the scope of the amendment, the court said:
Legislation, both statutory and Constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from an
experience of evils, but its general language should not, therefore, be neces-
sarily confined to the form that evil had theretofor taken. Time works
changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a
principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief
which gave it birth .... In the application of a Constitution, therefore,
our contemplation cannot be only what has been but of what may be.
id. at 373.
13. Appellate Courts rarely sustain appeals. See, e.g., Jackson v. Dickson, 325 F.2d
573 (9th Cir. 1963); In Re Wells, 35 Cal. 2d 889, 221 P.2d 947 (1950), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 937 (1951); Sims v. Balkcom, 220 Ga. 7, 136 S.E.2d 766 (1964). But see Black v.
United States, 269 F.2d 38, 43 (9th Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 938 (1959);
State v. Evans, 73 Idaho 50, 245 P.2d 788 (1952); State v. Kimbrough, 212 S.C. 348, 46
S.E.2d 273 (1948).
14. Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391 (1916). Holmes relies extensively on
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courts' failure to implement Weems is that until 1947 the eighth
amendment was not considered binding on the states.'5 In that year,
the Supreme Court held that the violation of the principles of the
eighth amendment "would be violative of the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment", and thus, "the Fourteenth would pro-
hibit by its due process clause, execution by a state in a cruel manner." "I
A third reason is that several courts have regarded the cruel and unusual
punishment clause as applying only to the legislature. 17 These courts
have taken the position that punishment is not cruel if it is within the
statutory limits prescribed for the crime."8 It is now generally accepted,
however, that the eighth amendment is a limitation on both legislative
and judicial action. 9
The Supreme Court again considered the scope of the amendment
in Trop v. Dulles,20 concluding that the punishment of expatriation was
cruel and unusual and, therefore, violative of the eighth amendment.
The case significantly expanded the cruelty test of Weems to encompass
mental as well as physical cruelty.2'
Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126, 136 (1903), in declaring the punishment constitu-
tional. "Undue leniency in one case does not transform a reasonable punishment in
another case to a cruel one.'
15. As originally adopted, the eighth amendment like the rest of the Bill of Rights
applied only to the national government. Pervear v. Commonwealth, 72 U.S. (5 Wall)
475 (1866). See, e.g., Matter of Garner, 179 Cal. 409, 177 P. 162 (1918); State v. Taylor,
293 Mo. 210, 238 S.W. 489 (1922); State v. Griffin, 84 N.JL. 429, 87 A. 138 (N.J. Sup.
Ct. 1913), af'd, 85 NJL. 613, 90 A. 259 (N.J. Ct. Err. & App. 1914).
16. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 462 (1947). The case of
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), relying on Resweber stated that the eighth
amendments prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment is applied to the states by
the fourteenth amendment.
17. E.g., Beckett v. United States, 84 F.2d 731 (6th Cir. 1936); Brown v. State, 152
Fla. 853, 13 So. 2d 458 (1943); Chavigney v. State, 112 So. 2d 910 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 922 (1960). Contra, United States ex rel Bongiorno v. Ragen,
54 F. Supp. 973 (N.D. IlM. 1944), aff'd, 146 F.2d 349 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S.
865 (1945); Barber v. Gladden, 210 Ore. 46, 309 P.2d 192 (1957), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
948 (1959).
18. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 247 Md. 530, 233 A.2d 791 (1967); Dutton v. State, 123
Md. 373, 91 A. 417 (1914).
19. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); United States v. McKinney, 427
F.2d 449, 455 (6th Cir. 1970).
20. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
21. "The uncertainty, and the consequent psychological hurt, which must accom-
pany one who has become an outcast in his own land must be reckoned a substantial
factor in the ultimate judgment." Id. at 111.
In speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Warren reemphasized the basic concept
embodied in the eighth amendment as "nothing less than the dignity of man." 356
US. at 100.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
The Trop case marked an expansion of Weems, but did nothing to
revitalize it. Not until 1963 was there an effort to redefine the limits
of the eighth amendment. In Rudolph v. Alabama,22 a convicted
rapist who had been sentenced to death was denied certiorari. In his
dissenting opinion Justice Goldberg formulated a basis for measuring
the limits of the eighth amendment.23 The opinion is significant in
two respects: it reasserted the legitimacy of a broad comparative law
approach in determining whether a punishment is cruelly excessive;
and secondly, it suggested a less vague standard for determining whether
a sentence passes permissible limits of society. 4
Accepting the test reemphasized in Trop,25 and applying the stand-
ards suggested by Justice Goldberg in Rudolph,2 the court in Ralph
v. Warden determined "that two factors coalesce to establish that the
death sentence is so disproportionate to the crime of rape when the
victim's life is neither taken nor endangered that it violates the Eighth
Amendment. First, in most jurisdictions death is now considered an
excessive penalty for rape .... Second, when a rapist does not take or
endanger the life of his victim, the selection of the death penalty from
the range of punishment authorized by statute is anomalous when com-
pared to the large number of rapists who are sentenced to prisons." 27
The decision is significant in that for the first time the death penalty
22. 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (dissent to denial of cert.).
23. The specific issues raised by the dissent were:
1. In light of the trend both in this country and throughout the world
against punishing rape by death, does the imposition of the death penalty
by those States which retain it for rape violate "evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of [our] maturing society," or "standards
of decency more or less universally accepted"?
2. Is the taking of human life to protect a value other than human life
consistent with the constitutional proscriptions against "punishments
which by their excessive ... severity are greatly disproportioned to the
offense charged"?
3. Can the permissible aims of punishment (e.g., deterrence, isolation, re-
habilitation) be achieved as effectively by punishing rape less severely
than by death (e.g., by life imprisonment); if so, does the imposition of
the death penalty for rape constitute "unnecessary cruelty"?
Id. at 889-91.
24. Id.
25. The eighth amendment should be viewed from a vantage point that discloses
the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 356
U.S. at 101.
26. Other cases had rejected the logic of the dissenting opinion in Rudolpb. E.g.,
Maxwell v. Stephens, 229 F. Supp. 205, 217 (E.D. Ark. 1964); Sims v. Balkcom, 220 Ga.
7, 136 S.E.2d 766, 769 (1964); Gordon v. State, 160 So. 2d 73, 76-7 (Miss. 1964).
27. No. 13,757 at 19 (4th Cir., Dec., 11, 1970).
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in a rape case was found to be cruel and unusual punishment within the
scope of the eighth amendment. By applying a test which encompasses
"contemporary human knowledge," the court suggests a widening of
the scope of the amendment, and provides a clear constitutional basis
upon which similar cases can be determined.2
JEFFREY L. MusMAN
Constitutional Law-PRIvILEGED COMMUNICATIONS-EFFECT OF
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS UPON GRAND JURY INVESTIGATIONS. Caldwell
v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
Earl Caldwell, a New York Times reporter who specializes in re-
porting the activities of the Black Panthers, was subpoenaed by a grand
jury to testify about his confidential interviews with Panther leaders.1
Claiming that compliance with the subpoena would infringe upon the
right of freedom of the press, Caldwell moved alternatively to quash
the subpoena and to limit the scope of the investigation.2
The district court, although refusing to quash the subpoena, became
the first court to hold that the first amendment protects a newsman
from disclosing confidential information unless a compelling and over-
riding need for the information is clearly established.3 Caldwell, how-
ever, claimed that the ruling did not adequately protect his first
amendment right to gather news because his tenuous relationship with
the Panthers would be destroyed merely by requiring him to appear at
the investigation. Accordingly, he refused to appear and was held in
contempt.4 On appeal of the contempt citation, the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit expanded upon the district court's decision by
holding that Caldwell is not required to appear at the investigation until
the party seeking disclosure establishes a compelling need for his
presence.5
Whenever a court orders a newsman to disclose confidential informa-
28. For a discussion of possible applications of such a test see Goldberg, Declaring
the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1773 (1970).
1. Application of Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358, 359 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
2. Id. at 360. The rationale underlying these motions was that Caldwell's consti-
tutional right to gather and disseminate news would be violated by requiring his
presence or by requiring him to disclose confidential information at the investigation
because either requirement would destroy the sensitive relationship between Caldwell
and the Panthers. Id. at 361.
3. Id. at 360, 362.
4. Caldwell v. United States, 431 F.2d 1081, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 1970).
5. Id. at 1089.
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